Second-wave Holocaust restitution, post-communist privatization, and the global triumph of neoliberalism in the 1990s by Ludi, Regula
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
Second-wave Holocaust restitution, post-communist privatization, and the
global triumph of neoliberalism in the 1990s
Ludi, Regula
Abstract: This article argues show that the emergence in the 1990s of a second wave of Holocaust‑era
restitution claims was not the result of a shift in mentalities leading to the sudden recognition of past
wrongs or the surge of repressed memories but rather part of a larger process involving major transfor-
mations in global capitalism and property regimes. Restitution, fashioned as re‑privatization, surfaced
in the early 1990s in connection with post‑Communist de‑collectivization and was included in neolib-
eral reform packages adopted by transitional societies in Central and Eastern Europe. By the end of
that decade, restitution attained a much wider significance as a token of justice, memory, and iden-
tity. International scrutiny of restitution mechanisms implemented by post‑Communist states turned the
restoration of property rights into an indicator of these societies’ commitment to human rights and their
willingness to address the legacies of their totalitarian past. As a “travelling concept” linking private
property with novel ideas of historical justice on its road from east to west and west to east, restitution
gradually changed from a method of advancing privatization and creating new polities to a carrier of
the memory of past wrongs. In this entirely new meaning, restitution became the heart of Holocaust
survivors’ fin‑de‑siècle call for justice and recognition.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/yod.2597
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-158247
Scientific Publication in Electronic Form
Published Version
 
 
The following work is licensed under a Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
Originally published at:
Ludi, Regula (2018). Second-wave Holocaust restitution, post-communist privatization, and the global
triumph of neoliberalism in the 1990s. Paris: Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/yod.2597
 Yod
Revue des études hébraïques et juives 
21 | 2018
Histoires transgénérationnelles
Second‑Wave Holocaust Restitution,
Post‑Communist Privatization, and the Global
Triumph of Neoliberalism in the 1990s
La deuxième vague de restitutions, la politique de privatisation de l’ère
postcommuniste et le triomphe généralisé du néo‑libéralisme dans les
années 1990
-ואנה ןוחצינו יטסינומוק‑טסופה ןדיעב הטרפהה תוינידמ ,ינשה םייוציפה לג
90-ה תונשב םזילארביל
Regula Ludi
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/yod/2597
DOI: 10.4000/yod.2597
ISSN: 2261-0200
Publisher
INALCO
Brought to you by Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Electronic reference
Regula Ludi, « Second‑Wave Holocaust Restitution, Post‑Communist Privatization, and the Global
Triumph of Neoliberalism in the 1990s », Yod [Online], 21 | 2018, Online since 29 March 2018,
connection on 19 November 2018. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/yod/2597  ; DOI : 10.4000/
yod.2597 
This text was automatically generated on 19 November 2018.
Yod – Revue des études hébraïques et juives est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence
Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d’Utilisation Commerciale - Partage dans les Mêmes Conditions
4.0 International.
Second‑Wave Holocaust Restitution,
Post‑Communist Privatization, and
the Global Triumph of Neoliberalism
in the 1990s
La deuxième vague de restitutions, la politique de privatisation de l’ère
postcommuniste et le triomphe généralisé du néo‑libéralisme dans les
années 1990
-ואנה ןוחצינו יטסינומוק‑טסופה ןדיעב הטרפהה תוינידמ ,ינשה םייוציפה לג
90-ה תונשב םזילארביל
Regula Ludi
1 Like no previous decade, the 1990s were under the grip of an obsession with Nazi‑era
legacies.  Grievances  of  Holocaust  survivors,  aimed  at  European  governments  and
corporations, resurged in huge numbers and with unprecedented vehemence. The calls
for restitution and reparations troubled diplomats and politicians on both sides of the
Atlantic.  Arousing  public  preoccupation with  the  Third  Reich’s  policies  of  genocide,
plunder,  and  exploitation,  the  restitution  campaign  profoundly  changed  our
understanding of Nazi mass murder. A new Holocaust awareness left its distinctive mark
on Europe’s evolving culture of memory. It framed the notion of international obligations
that arose after the collapse of the bipolar world order and undergirded the period’s
enthusiasm for  lofty  humanitarian  rhetoric.  “Holocaust  restitution,”  Michael  Marrus
states, “carried with it a distinct flavor of human rights.”1
2 When Holocaust restitution claims first resurfaced in 1995, however, they took almost
everybody by surprise. Following an international settlement of World War II liabilities in
the early 1950s, governments, the public, and, in particular, those non‑state actors which
were the main targets of survivors’ accusations considered the issue closed. But, within
months  of  the  first  new  claims,  calls  for  restitution  and  reparations  had  become
ubiquitous  as  the  number  of  grievances  ballooned.  Survivors’  complaints  rapidly
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expanded in scope and dimension to encompass corporations and financial institutions,
churches,  museums,  and  other  public  bodies  in  formerly  belligerent  and  neutral
countries. The ‘Holocaust‑era restitution campaign,’ as the array of differing claims was
soon to be called, rapidly gained momentum. It resonated with the media and impacted
on international relations once claimants started filing class‑action suits in American
courts.  Almost  as  surprising as  the sudden emergence of  these complaints  was their
resolution. By the end of the century, most of the grievances had resulted in negotiated
settlements  that  provided  considerable  funds  to  be  allocated  as  small  compensation
payments to millions of Nazi victims and their descendants all over the globe.2
3 Given the subject’s previous absence from public debate and international diplomacy, its
recurrence in the 1990s is puzzling and demands explanation. The willingness of those
who were targeted by the campaign to settle with the plaintiffs does too. After a brief
period of denial and resistance, the accused corporations yielded and agreed to guarantee
fairly large lump‑sum payments to plaintiffs. In so doing, they accepted responsibility for
their  past  behavior‑this,  at  least,  was  the  general  impression.  Moreover,  in  most
countries  debate  over  restitution  went  hand  in  hand  with  an  extensive  historical
examination of Nazi‑era robbery and looting. Through this scrunity, a more complex and
troubling picture of the entanglements of European societies with Nazi policies emerged.
Research revealed, for example, the involvement of private business in the exploitation of
slave labor and showed that large sectors of national economies, even in unoccupied and
neutral countries, benefited from the spoliation of Jews and the cloaking of Nazi flight
capital.  It  exposed the  lucrative  transactions  conducted among financial  institutions,
trustees,  lawyers,  and other private brokers and Nazi  businesses.  In general,  a  much
higher  degree  of  complicity  in  the  expropriation  of  Jews  was  revealed  than  had
previously been acknowledged.
4 While the campaign sharpened our understanding of the scope of Nazi plunder and its
postwar repercussions, its proponents stressed the paradigmatically moral character of
survivors’  calls  for  redress.  The  Clinton  administration’s  Special  Envoy  on  Property
Restitution in Central and Eastern Europe, Stuart E. Eizenstat, for instance, depicted his
mission as a “crusade” that “laid the groundwork for resolving future disputes arising
from man’s inhumanity to man, proving that it is possible to bring justice, even imperfect
justice, to an unjust world.”3 The term ‘crusade,’ and the religious imagery it conjures up,
testifies to the moral significance that was ascribed to the campaign. Besides alleviating
survivors’ material needs, which was clearly vital for impoverished claimants and those
living in Eastern Europe and Russia, belated compensation payments apparently carried
political significance as the vestige of international morality.
5 Contemporary observers accordingly invested these events with moral significance. They
would serve as a “model for obtaining justice for historical wrongs,” Michael J. Bazyler, a
legal scholar specializing in transnational human‑rights advocacy, prophesized. Praising
the role that the American court system played in enabling transnational litigation, he
added,  “One  of  the  enduring  legacies  of  the  Holocaust  restitution  movement  is  the
precedent  it has  set  for  addressing  other  injustices  of  the  past.”4 Sociologists  and
historians likewise took Holocaust restitution as indicative of broader transformations.
Signifying “the increasing importance of morality and the growing democratization of
political  life,”  restitution  campaigns  should  be  understood  as  the  harbinger  of  a
cosmopolitan  value  system  that  would  rely  on  negotiated  justice,  Elazar Barkan
suggested.5 For many observers, Holocaust restitution thus represented “a template for a
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new era of financial relief and recognition of victims of crimes against humanity.” Some
authors even predicted that the campaign would produce lasting changes in corporate
behavior  by  providing  a  “new  idiom  of  responsibility”  that  would  encourage
transnational corporations to comply with universal moral standards in order to avoid
future  human‑rights  litigation  and  its  attendant  risks  to  reputation.6 Sociologists
interpreted these events as the catalyst of a profound transformation in the articulation
of justice claims. Its gist was a shift from the forward‑looking ambition to realize a more
egalitarian society to a new concern for past injustices, John Torpey, for example, argued.
7 Indeed,  the  restitution  campaign  became  “part  of  a  much  greater  phenomenon,
involving  truth  commissions,  international  criminal  trials  and  claims  to  justice  for
historic wrongs.” 8 Likewise it impacted the new field of knowledge production that had
been unfolding under the umbrella of transitional justice since the late 1980s and helped
shape  the  evolving  international  vernacular  for  dealing  with  the  past.9 As  a  result,
reparations  were  integrated  into  the  increasingly  conventionalized  toolkit  that
transnational experts offered to societies facing the challenges of past political violence.
6 However,  few of  the  high  expectations  associated  with  the  Holocaust‑era  restitution
campaign  have  been  realized.  Instead,  international  sensitivities  have  changed
dramatically in the wake of 9/11. With the global war on terror and, in more recent years,
the financial crisis dominating the international agenda, concerns about the legacies of
systematic  violence  and  gross  human‑rights  violations  have  rapidly  faded.  And,
subsequent  human‑rights  litigation  modeled  on  Holocaust  restitution  has  not  been
successful. Rather, most of the claims that have since been filed in American courts have
stalled  for  technical  reasons.  They  did  so  even  before  a  recent  U.S.  Supreme  Court
decision  limited  applicability  of  the  Alien  Tort  Claims  Act,  the  eighteenth‑century
legislation  excavated  in 1980  to  provide  a  legal  basis  for  litigation  involving
extraterritorial acts and foreign plaintiffs or defendants. Commentators worry that this
decision, which slams the door on foreign victims of human‑rights violations seeking
redress in U.S. courts, might halt the trend towards universal jurisdiction.10
7 Not only have these developments lowered idealistic expectations, they also invite critical
revision of the history of Holocaust‑era restitution. The dominant narrative describes the
restitution  campaign’s  success  as  a  realization  of  justice  idealistically  motivated  by
cultural developments, such as a new awareness of human rights and remembrance of the
Holocaust. In fact, that narrative often resembles a parable about the triumph of good
over  evil  in  which  the  victims  are  restored,  the  culprits  converted,  and  the  public
enlightened thanks to its cathartic soul‑searching. But has not the desired outcome, the
advent  of  a  golden  age  of  human  rights  and  justice,  perhaps  given  rise  to  skewed
representations of these events that obfuscate important aspects of the story? On a closer
reading, the dominant narrative raises fundamental methodological questions and even
hints at larger problems in the theory and philosophy of history.
8 At the same time, the imagery applied by the Holocaust‑era restitution campaign, its talk
of “unfinished Holocaust business” and a “final accounting,” contrasts sharply with the
impression of a new idealism prevailing in the struggle for justice. The metaphors used in
the dominant narrative to characterize the restitution campaign and explain its moral
significance  are  often  borrowed from business  and  finance.  They  refer  to  a  delayed
accounting of past abuse and the payment of an outstanding debt.11 Stuart E. Eizenstat,
for  instance,  titled  the  concluding  chapter  of  his  2003  autobiographical  report  on
Holocaust‑era  restitution  “A  Final  Accounting  for  World War II.”12 What makes  such
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imagery  attractive?  What relationship  among  past  injustice,  its reparation,
and bookkeeping does it suggest?
9 As a simple observation, the financial vocabulary pervading the discussion of restitution
indicated deep ties between money and justice, ties that were further emphasized by the
monetization in the 1990s of a wide range of claims including many that did not concern
material losses. Polemics soon appeared. Elie Wiesel, horrified by the idea of calibrating
“the greatest tragedy in Jewish history in terms of money,” saw a fundamental dilemma
couched  within  the  question:  “how  does  one  measure  human  suffering  in  terms  of
material  reward?”13 Vitriolic  denunciations  of  restitution  litigation  as  a  “reparations
business,” a “growing scandal,” and the “Holocaust industry” targeted the campaign’s
weak spot, viz., the discrepancy between the huge amounts of money involved and its
advocates’, in particular class‑action lawyers’, insistence on the humanitarian sentiments
driving  their  efforts.  The  controversy  reflected  a  widespread  discomfort  with  this
mixture of money, morality, and memory politics. And, the juxtaposition, or even
conflation, of moral and financial language did not help to defang the criticism.14
10 Commentators also worried that public exhibitions of victims’ suffering staged by their
attorneys for their emotional impact and haggling over the prize of settlements would
trivialize  unforgivable  wrongs.  “[M]oney  becomes  the  sorry  center  of  the  whole
restitution business,” complained Michael Ignatieff in 2000. And, he was certainly not the
only one to express unease about the demand for justice being framed in financial terms.
15Such remarks disparagingly implied that money, as the medium of restitution, was its
message. Yet, this was an equation to which some of the campaign’s protagonists had no
problem subscribing.  “I  think there  is  a  certain symbolic  quality,”  Stuart E. Eizenstat
asserted, “that only money can convey to repair the injustices.”16
11 So, instead of rejecting the equation of money and justice as an aberration of the moral
tenets involved, it may be more useful for our understanding of second‑wave Holocaust
restitution to consider the monetization of claims as an essential precondition for their
resonating as powerfully as they did.  This would situate restitution in the context of
larger economic changes rather than to conceive of it purely as an issue of “righting past
wrongs,” a problem exclusively concerning law and morality. After all, it is only in fairy
tales that justice prevails simply because it ought to. In reality, claims for justice are
successful by virtue of their association with powerful interests. And, nowhere, not even
in Israel, did Holocaust survivors—or any other group of Nazi victims for that matter—
constitute an important voice or a constituency in control of the instruments of power.
Hence, in order to understand the sudden emergence and largely successful settlement of
restitution claims, one has to look for other reasons.
12 It is my contention, in brief, that Holocaust‑era restitution was so successful not despite
the commodification of claims but precisely because those claims were about money, for
in expressing the demands of justice and morality in the vernacular of ownership they
thereby employed the imagery of the then dominating economic discourse. To support
my  assertion,  I  offer  an  alternative  reading  of  the  history  of  the 1990s  restitution
movement  by  taking  into  consideration  the  circumstances  under  which  the  call  for
reversing expropriation first emerged as an international issue. That draws attention to
the fall of Communism and the subsequent transition in Central and Eastern Europe in
which property restitution was an integral part of the reform packages aimed at the
creation  of  market  economies,  packages  originating  in  the  neoliberal  philosophy  of
deregulation  and  privatization.  Marking  a  break  in  the  history  of  the  regulation  of
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capitalism,  these  policies  were  first  tested  in Chile  after  the  military  coup  of
General Augusto Pinochet  and  became  the  main  feature  of  the  neoconservative
revolution  in  the  West  that  Margaret Thatcher  and  Ronald Reagan  spearheaded  in
the 1980s.  By  the  end  of  that  decade,  “market  fundamentalism”  had  conquered
mainstream economic discourse; Chicago‑school economists flocked to the sanctuaries of
power and influence and, vested with the authority of international financial institutions,
offered their advice to post‑Communist governments.17
13 Those transformations in global capitalism, which included the deregulation of financial
markets, a global surge in privatization, profound changes in labor relations, and a shift
of power to investors and shareholders, set the stage for the advent of restitution as a
claim for international justice. The circumstances under which the demand to right past
wrongs first surfaced left their distinct imprint on the meaning of restitution, both the
envisaged  instruments  and  practices  as  well  as  the  interpretation  of  the  underlying
wrongs and their present significance. Therefore, in order to understand what Holocaust
restitution  in  the 1990s  was  all  about,  we  need  to  consider  its  origins  in  the
post‑Communist  transition.  Before  addressing  that  history,  however,  I  will  briefly
summarize the dominant  narrative of  the Holocaust‑era restitution campaign.  In the
following sections, I will then sketch out the history of post‑Communist privatization in
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  in  order  to  show  that  claims  for  the  return  of  private
property were part of economic reforms long before they were again associated with Nazi
crimes. As a result of those events, new ideas of ownership, which interlocked with justice
and human rights in an entirely novel manner, emerged and prepared the ground for
second‑wave Holocaust restitution.
 
A Triumph of Justice: The Romantic Narrative of
Holocaust‑Era Restitution
14 It all began in the spring of 1995, the familiar narrative goes, when a series of reports
accusing Swiss banks of appropriating the savings of Holocaust victims appeared in the
Israeli  press.  For  decades,  the  stories  claimed,  bankers  in  Switzerland  had  refused
survivors access to the accounts of deceased family members and failed to comply with
international restitution obligations regarding heirless Jewish property.18 In Switzerland,
very  little  was  known  about  that  history  and,  except  for  a  handful  of  specialists,
everybody  responded  with  amazement,  if  not  irritation,  to  the  allegations.19 Jewish
organizations,  spearheaded  by  the  World Jewish Congress  under  Edgar Bronfman’s
energetic and confrontational leadership, were quick to adopt the survivors’ cause. The
political  climate  appeared  favorable  for  the  claimants.  The  attacks  on  Swiss  banks
coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of  the end of  World War II,  a  time of  solemn
remembrance,  official  demonstration  of  sympathy  with  the  victims,  and  heightened
public interest in Nazi‑era history. The campaign gained traction politically in April 1996
as Republican Senator Alfonse D’Amato, the head of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee,
who was running for re‑election in the state of New York, staged public hearings at which
individual  survivors  and  representatives  of  the  Swiss  banking  industry  testified.  In
linking the legacy of the Holocaust to Wall Street and questions of financial regulation,
the hearings transformed the campaign’s claims into a problem of American domestic
politics.20
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15 This gave survivors and Jewish organizations the opportunity for which they had long
waited. In the fall of 1996, they filed class‑action suits against Swiss banks in American
courts, probing the new weapons of transnational jurisdiction that were being forged
since the early 1980s. Almost instantly, governments, parliaments, diplomats, courts, and,
of course, the media were involved, in one way or another, with the campaign. “Within a
short time, restitution became a global issue,” Michael Marrus observed.21 Holocaust‑era
legacies  became  the  subject  of  international  conferences,  congressional  hearings,
behind‑the‑scenes negotiations,  and public debate.  Nevertheless,  the chances of court
decisions in favor of the claimants were modest. No precedent existed for this type of
litigation,  and  the  plaintiffs  faced  enormous  legal  obstacles  including  statutes  of
limitation and issues of territorial jurisdiction.22 But, the campaign’s protagonists were
not easily discouraged by the faint prospects for favorable court rulings. Realizing that
the reputations of the accused Swiss banks were particularly vulnerable at a time when
they  aspired  to  expand  their  operations  in  the  booming  American  market  and,  so,
depended  on  American  regulators’  approval  of  a  planned  mega‑merger,  restitution
advocates  aimed  for  their  adversaries’  Achilles  heel.  They  issued  boycott  threats
accompanied by a concerted press campaign.  And their strategy worked.  The call  for
sanctions resonated with the American public. It also found the support of chief financial
officers and pension‑fund managers who threatened to disinvest if the banks failed to
heed the survivors’ complaints.23
16 In  August 1998,  following  two years  of  public  criticism  and  behind‑the‑scenes
negotiations, the accused banks gave in. Litigation ended in an out‑of‑court settlement in
which the banks offered the plaintiffs a global compensation payment of $1.25 billion, a
sum unprecedented in human‑rights litigation.24 This lump‑sum payment covered claims
resulting from unreturned assets (heirless and “dormant” accounts) plus a wide range of
injuries  for  which  the  banks  did  not  bear  legal  responsibility.  This  latter  category
included,  for  instance,  the  exploitation  of  slave  labor  by  Swiss  companies  in
Nazi‑controlled  areas  and  the  expulsion  of  refugees  at  the  Swiss  border  for  which
government agencies were accountable. The fact that the banks took the sins of others
onto themselves reveals how little, in their perception, the case was about responsibility
for past wrongs. Instead, for the banks it was simply a matter of realizing that gaining
unhindered access to global markets was, at times, a demanding ambition that had a price
tag attached. And, indeed, their financial concessions paid off. Compliance paved the way
for expanding their banking activity in the U.S. market,  and handsome profits in the
following years showed that restitution had been a good investment.25
17 For the survivors, the Swiss case was only the beginning. Stimulated by its example, other
groups of previously neglected Nazi victims voiced their grievances and filed claims in
American courts. The restitution campaign “mushroomed into transnational public law
litigation on a grand scale,” one author marveled in 2004.26 The class‑action suit against
the Swiss banks served as the model for the Holocaust related action that followed among
which were those of former forced and slave laborers demanding unpaid salaries from
transnational corporations. Survivors and heirs of deceased Holocaust victims also filed
complaints against insurance companies and art collectors in which they demanded the
return of  confiscated  insurance  policies and looted pieces  of  art,  jewelry,  and other
valuables. In most of these cases, the legal argument innovatively replaced the concept of
(individual) guilt with a notion of liability resulting from a corporation’s “aiding and
abetting” state crimes. Moreover, charging corporations with unjust enrichment shifted
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the  focus  “from past  injustice  to  the  present  wrongful  holding  of  ill‑gotten  gains,”
Leora Bilsky explained.27
18 By the end of the century, most of the lawsuits had resulted in negotiated settlements,
that is, political rather than legal resolutions. In exchange for considerable lump‑sum
payments, the claimants withdrew their suits and, as urged by governments and accused
corporations, agreed to desist from further legal action (“legal peace”). In the case of
German  forced  labor  compensation,  the  overall  sum  amounted  to  €  4.4  billion  and
provided benefits to a total of 1.66 million survivors. Most settlements, furthermore, were
preceded by difficult multilateral negotiations involving government officials and various
non‑state agents and often brokered by eminent personalities in American public life who
also coordinated and monitored the allocation of money.28 In the slave and forced labor
case,  for instance,  German government officials,  the plaintiffs’  attorneys,  members of
Jewish  organizations,  delegates  of  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  from
which most of  the forced laborers had come,  and,  finally,  representatives of  German
corporations  participated  in  the 2000  agreement establishing  the  foundation
“Remembrance, Responsibility and Future.” Instead of delegating the implementation to
reparations bureaucracies notorious for their red tape, this settlement mandated that
private associations and humanitarian agencies in recipient countries allocate the funds.
29
19 The restitution campaign did not only benefit a large number of previously neglected
victims. It  sprouted a new industry of NGOs acting as victims’ advocates and lawyers
specializing in human‑rights litigation. And, by intersecting and partly coalescing with
changes in the culture of memory, it informed the emergence of past injustice as a new
category of political discourse. Moreover, it consolidated the Holocaust’s new significance
in Western self‑reflection, a development that had been propelled by previous political
controversy  and  cultural  events,  such  as  “Schindler’s  List,”  Steven  Spielberg’s
award‑winning film of 1992.  In drawing large audiences worldwide,  Spielberg’s  movie
popularized the American representation of the Jewish genocide, a narrative organized
around the categories of  good and evil,  and confronted the European public with its
inclination  to  universalize  the  moral  lessons  of  the  Holocaust.  As  a  result  of  these
developments, survivors acquired a “heightened public profile” and an aura that “elicits
honor,  respect,  fascination,  and  no  small  degree  of  awe,”  as  students  of  Holocaust
memory observed.30
20 In the literature, therefore, second‑wave Holocaust restitution is often understood to be a
consequence of those shifts in the culture of memory. The first calls for restitution did
indeed coincide with manifestations of the Holocaust’s changed meaning in European
societies. In 1995, official events to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the end of
World War II quite unprecedentedly included acknowledgments of moral responsibility
for  the  extermination  of  Jews.  In  France,  for  instance,  President  Jacques Chirac
acknowledged, for the first time, French complicity in the implementation of the “final
solution.”31 Similarly,  on  the  occasion  of  an  official  commemoration  of  the  end  of
World War II, Kaspar Villiger expressed the Swiss government’s regret over his country’s
restrictive wartime asylum policy and the harm it caused Jewish refugees. In Germany,
where controversy about the place of the Third Reich in national history had repeatedly
flared  up in  the 1980s,  a travelling  exhibition  about  the  Wehrmacht’s  crimes  opened
in 1995.  Revealing  ordinary  soldiers’  participation  in  massacres  of  Jews  and  other
civilians, the exhibition sparked intensely emotional responses. Fanning the flames of
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those  controversies,  in 1996,  the political  scientist  Daniel J. Goldhagen confronted the
public with his contention that anti‑Semitism was deeply ingrained in German culture
and had been the driving force for those who had participated in mass‑shootings and
operated the extermination machinery. According to the historian Wulf Kansteiner, these
events  had  transnational  repercussions  and  heralded the  transformation  of  Europe’s
“divisive memory of Nazi aggression and occupation into a shared, self‑critical memory of
an era of European human‑rights abuses that unites former victims, perpetrators, and
bystanders.”32
21 Research in  the  late 1990s,  often carried  out  by  historical  commissions  appointed in
response  to  the  accusations  of  the  Holocaust‑era  restitution  campaign,  and  the
subsequent grappling with the past in most European societies underscored that trend
and  tremendously  increased  the  relevance  of  Nazi‑era  history.  They  spurred
transnational  initiatives  that  placed  the  Holocaust  at  the  center  of  a  debate  about
European  identity  and  values.  Efforts  to  institutionalize  Holocaust  memory,  which
culminated in the Stockholm conference of January 2000, resulted in the establishment of
the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and
Research  (ITF)  (later  renamed  the  International  Holocaust  Remembrance  Alliance
(IHRA)), an intergovernmental body for coordinating state and civil‑society activities for
promoting public awareness of the suffering caused by Nazi crimes.33 This concurrence of
Holocaust remembrance and the restitution campaign has given rise to the presumption
of  “the  obvious,  indeed,  organic  interconnection  between  the  restitution  of
private‑property rights and the evocation of past memories.”34 Property restitution was,
as  a  result,  increasingly equated with recognition of  victimhood and associated with
features considered essential to personhood such as individual identity and social agency.
However, the extent to which restitution was itself the result of “recovered memory,” as
Dan Diner claimed, remains to be determined. In fact, the relationship between memory
and restitution is more complicated and, in any case, there is no direct causal chain from
Holocaust memory to appreciation of the significance of ownership for victims’ identities.
Therefore, the question of why property has become so central to remembrance, identity,
and recognition remains unanswered.  Exploring the more recent  history of  property
restitution and, specifically, its origins in the context of the post‑Communist transition
will provide some clarification.
 
A Different Genealogy: Post‑Communist Privatization
in Central and Eastern Europe
22 In reality, second‑wave Holocaust restitution did not begin with the claims against Swiss
banks. Its origins date back to the early 1990s and programs implemented after the fall of
Communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the objections of former dissidents,
the desirability  of  a  “market  economy anchored to the fundamental  right  of  private
property” seemed “almost self‑evident” in 1989.35 Most of the countries in the region
were heavily in debt and in desperate need of help from Western governments, the World
Bank,  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF).  The  transition,  therefore,  largely
followed the prescriptions laid down in the “Washington Consensus,” a reform program
for eliminating structural problems in debt‑ridden countries of Latin America initially
devised  in 1988/89  by  American  policy  advisers  and  experts  in  the  Bretton Woods
institutions.  The  program  centered  on  deregulation,  financial  liberalization,  fiscal
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discipline, and privatization as the key strategies for economic revitalization. In the early
1990s,  the  “entire  package  of  policy  recommendations  was  ‘offered’  to  Central  and
Eastern Europe as well,” the economic historian Ivan T. Berend summarized.36 And, the
region’s new leaders eagerly embraced it. A profound change in ownership structures—
the  privatization  of  state‑owned  retail  businesses,  farmland,  housing,  banks,  and
industrial plants—“was widely considered one of the keystones of the entire transition
process.”37 Reformers  believed that  a  rapid transition from state  planning to  private
enterprise was the only way to end the region’s  deep structural  crisis  and stimulate
economic growth. International financial institutions bolstered this judgment. In its 1996
Development  Report,  the  World Bank  declared  that  “fully  specified  property  rights
reward  effort  and  good  judgment,  thereby  assisting  economic  growth  and  wealth
creation.”38
23 With its neoliberal thrust, the post‑Communist transition seemed to bring to completion
a development that had started in the late 1970s. At that time, supply‑side economics and
public‑choice theory, which promised to remedy the world’s economic problems, offered
what  proponents  claimed  was  a  viable  alternative  to  the  discontents  of  Keynesian
regulation with its inability to overcome the unprecedented combination of inflation and
stagnation  (stagflation)  characteristic  of  the 1970s’  recession.  Their  insistence  on
downsizing public administration and curtailing state regulation endeared neoliberals to
conservatives  disgruntled  by  growing  public  expenditures  and  high  taxation.  As  a
program for economic policy, neoliberalism made its first sweeping breakthrough in the
1980s  following  Margaret Thatcher’s  electoral  victory  in  Great Britain  in 1979  and
Ronald Reagan’s taking office in the United States in 1981.  The long‑term impact was
enormous. International financial institutions and governments opened their doors to the
expertise offered by the mushrooming neoliberal think‑tank industry and policy advisers
trained  in  Chicago‑school  economics.39 Invigorated  by  the  economic  failure  of  state
regulation in the Communist bloc, “market romantics” in the 1990s spread their message
with an “evangelical  approach.”40 Deregulation and privatization became mainstream
policy;  even  the  UN General Assembly—normally  not  known  for  particularly
capitalist‑friendly  attitudes—issued  one  declaration  after  another  endorsing  private
ownership and economic  liberalization.41 Neoliberalism,  masquerading “as  a  radically
populist philosophy,” succeeded in establishing “what is widely perceived nowadays as
‘simple common sense’ in the realm of politics.”42
24 Yet, privatization, as post‑Communist policy planners and reformers imagined it, was far
more  than  an  instrument  to  stimulate  growth  and  spur  recovery.  Considered  the
foundation of the self‑regulating market, private ownership, they believed, would serve
as the ultimate guarantor of individual agency and freedom “not only for those who own
property, but scarcely less for those who do not,” as F. A. Hayek had explained in 1944. To
neoliberal authors, any kind of state tampering with private property was anathema, seen
as a step on “the road to serfdom” because, ultimately, it would suffocate competition
and thus prevent the free interplay of market forces from organizing society in a manner
that guaranteed individual freedom.43 Holding out the prospect of a radical break with
the paralyzing restrictions and dire realities under Communist rule, such ideas proved
attractive to a younger generation of economists and politicians in Central and Eastern
Europe.  Donald Tusk,  declared in 1989,  “We want to move towards a Poland where…
property rights are guaranteed and where liberty stems from private property.”44
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25 Reformers, therefore, did not tire of stressing the relationship between private ownership
and political transformation. They expected privatization to “create a nascent middle
class that has a stake in the creation and maintenance of an effective system of property
rights  and the  pursuit  of  economic  policies  that  would  enable  the  private  sector  to
flourish.”45 It would “counteract any concentration of power in the political system and
contribute to social  stability,” the World Bank expounded.46 The assumption that the
widespread distribution of property rights would create a large constituency in support
of radical reform also led to the equating of private ownership with democracy, a line of
thought which drew on Margaret Thatcher’s vision of “popular capitalism” resulting, in
her words, from “a crusade to enfranchise the many in the economic life of the nation.”47
26 Hence, there is broad consensus in the literature that privatization was not dictated by
economic requirements alone but was to a large extent driven by ideology and political
considerations. “The most fundamental goal of privatization was political… The dominant
political aim of the reformers was to break up hegemonic state power and make private
ownership  the  foundation  of  freedom  and  democracy,”  explained  the  economist
Anders Ålsund,  a  policy  advisor  with  solid  neoliberal  credentials.48 Property  reforms,
accordingly, topped the agendas of post‑Communist governments in the early 1990s. As
an “interrelated international  phenomenon,”  they enjoyed enthusiastic  support  from
leading Western economists, such as Jeffrey Sachs, Lawrence Summers, and David Lipton,
who acted as policy advisers to post‑Communist governments and produced a new body
of  knowledge  that  was  quickly  spread  through  the  activity  of  transnational  experts
pushing  for  particularly  radical  change.  Western  governments  offered  additional
incentives  by  funding  privatization  programs.  The  European  Union  spent  more  to
advance private ownership than on any other area of aid to institutional and economic
reforms in post‑Communist countries apart from infrastructure.49 As a result, Central and
Eastern Europe became a huge laboratory with economic experts “using the region as a
testing ground to  investigate  the validity  of  classic  propositions.”  At  the same time,
reform efforts  engendered  “cognitive  harmonization”  among their  main  proponents,
including the Bretton Woods institutions and the EU, about the free market’s superior
problem‑solving capacity.50
27 Mainly in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the new leaders opted for early and brutal “shock
treatment,”  the  so‑called  ‘Big  Bang  approach,’  in  the  belief  “that  a  painful  but  fast
operation was the best way to cope with the towering problems of regime change.”51 The
rush to deregulate and privatize paid off. It earned reformers international approval. The
World Bank rewarded Poland with generous debt relief, and Czech voucher privatization,
fervently  defended  by  Václav Klaus,  the  finance  minister  in  the  country’s  first
post‑Communist government, was soon emulated elsewhere as the road to success. This
“pet  idea  of  liberal  economists,”  which  the  University  of  Chicago  economist
Milton Friedman  claimed  as  his  own,  consisted  in  the  distribution  to  all  citizens  of
vouchers for buying shares in state‑owned companies.52 Politically, it was meant to kill
two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it appeared to be the most effective way to
separate the former nomenklatura from the instruments of power. On the other hand, by
transforming ordinary citizens into stakeholders,  mass privatization was supposed to
stimulate entrepreneurial thinking among the public and increase popular approval of
the free market. In the belief that the market would provide infallible mechanisms for
organizing and regulating the polity, mass privatization followed a scheme that would
eventually  turn  the  relationship  between  the  state  and  the  market  on  its  head,  as
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Michel Foucault predicted in his analysis of neoliberal philosophy. No longer would the
state control the market, but, on the contrary, it would be subjected to market forces and
the limits they would impose on public policy. At the same time, political power would
receive its  legitimacy from citizens’  economic activity;  in other words,  through their
participation in the market as consumers and producers, individuals would automatically
affirm the institutional framework.53 With individuals enfranchised by their shares in
once  public  enterprises,  citizenship  would  become  a  form  of  ownership,  and
citizen‑stakeholders  would  constitute  the  new  polity.  By generating  conditions  of
competition, ownership would, according to these assumptions, be the engine of political
change.
28 In reality, the results of privatization were not quite as constructive as its advocates had
predicted. Instead of radically redistributing ownership, voucher privatization led to the
concentration of shares in investment funds owned by banks most of which were still in
state hands. And, it largely benefited those who were in a position to exploit the period’s
legal  uncertainty.  In  breading  corruption,  mass  privatization  undermined  public
confidence in the new system and in countries like Russia and the Ukraine allowed a
group of oligarchs to enrich themselves by gaining control of key sectors of the economy
and, at times, exert considerable political influence.54
29 Still,  the  structural  impact  of  privatization  was  dramatic.  By  the  mid‑2000s,  the
private‑sector contribution to GDP in post‑Communist countries often reached the levels
of West‑European economies. Within less than a decade, this proportion had risen from
between five and ten percent to 70 percent, even 80 percent in some places. Whether
there was any direct relationship between privatization and growth, however, remains
controversial  in  the  literature.55 Less  so  are  the  social  costs.  In  the 1990s,  formerly
Communist societies were hit by huge increases in unemployment, rising poverty rates,
and a widening gap between rich and poor. In the first three years after the fall of the
Berlin  Wall,  East  Germany  suffered  the  loss  of  five  million  jobs,  and  thousands  of
businesses  were  liquidated.  In  countries  which  privatized  enormous  amounts  of
agricultural  land,  such  as  Bulgaria,  productivity  temporarily  dropped  by  almost  50
percent.  The  huge  demand  for  capital  made  post‑Communist  economies  ever  more
dependent on foreign investment,  and ownership relations clearly shifted in favor of
foreign capital. In Hungary, for instance, more than 80 percent of investment is from
abroad and, by the end of the last decade, roughly half of all employees were working for
foreign‑owned companies.56 In sum, property reforms radically transformed societies and
produced their integration into global markets with breath‑taking speed.
 
Restitution and the New Language of Ownership and
Human Rights in the 1990s
30 The resurgence of  restitution claims cannot  be separated from the larger  process  of
property reform. From the very beginning, privatization in Central and Eastern Europe
was confronted with demands for re‑privatization, that is, the return of property that had
been confiscated under  Communist  rule.  Strong lobbies  called  for  the  restoration of
previous ownership to reverse the collectivization of farmland, businesses, and housing.
Citizens eager to roll back the clock and forget their own compliance with the old system
wished to return to the conditions that existed in the interwar period, when the countries
of  Central  and Eastern Europe had first  enjoyed national  sovereignty.  The desire for
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re‑privatization was so rampant that observers talked about “restitution frenzy in newly
emerging market  economies.”57 Therefore,  hardly any transitional  government (apart
from Russia and nations in the eastern parts of the former Soviet Union) dared to ignore
the call for property restitution, objections over anticipated new injustices and delays in
economic reforms notwithstanding.58 At  an early stage of  transition,  post‑Communist
governments  enacted special  legislation defining who was entitled to restitution and
simplifying procedures for obtaining it. The most extensive programs were implemented
in Bulgaria,  the Czech Republic,  and the Baltic states;  Hungary, by contrast,  opted for
compensation payments instead of restitution in kind. Only Poland, where conflicting
demands were deeply mired in political struggles and antagonistic agendas prevented
any of the more than a dozen bills from being signed into law, failed to pass special
legislation.59
31 According  to  the  literature,  governments  adopted  restitution  programs  partly  for
pragmatic  reasons.  Restoration  of  previous  ownership  facilitated  privatization  by
catering to powerful pressure groups and creating “a constituency supportive of capital
reforms.”60 Restitution was also considered a clean method of de‑collectivization because
it  helped prevent  undesirable  insider  privatization by managers,  who were normally
members of the former nomenklatura. Moreover, clarification of legal entitlement in cases
of conflicting property claims was essential to wining investors’ confidence. Therefore,
restitution was meant to contribute to the establishment of the firm property rights that
were considered a prerequisite for economic growth.61 In addition to such pragmatic
reasons,  restitution  also  enjoyed  widespread  public  support  as  a  form  of  justice.
Returning collectivized property to those from whom it had been confiscated was meant
to vindicate the victims of political persecution under Communist rule. Any privatization
program  that  did  not  acknowledge  that  Communist  governments  had  expropriated
property not only to nationalize the economy but also as a political weapon to enforce
conformity  and  eliminate  the  bourgeoisie  would  have  lacked  legitimacy  and  public
approval in the transitional period’s climate of vehement anti‑Communism. And, finally,
restoring private ownership was thought of “as an aid to social regeneration” because it
illustrated the sort of property regime reformers wanted to establish.62 In sum, almost all
transitional governments viewed “the principle of restitution as fundamental to their
programs of denationalization and as a means of granting compensation for what is now
viewed  as  ‘illegal’  communist  expropriation,  the  Bulgarian  legal  scholar
Mariana Karadjova summarized.”63
32 At  the  same  time,  the  call  for  restitution  raised  huge  difficulties  requiring  political
solutions. Who should be entitled to restitution? What types of confiscation should be
redressed?  And,  in  the  case  of  conflicting  ownership,  which  claimants  should  have
priority? In a region of Europe which had experienced violent disruptions and political
repression long before the Communists came to power, such questions were particularly
thorny. Fascist regimes, Nazi occupation authorities, and postwar governments had all
confiscated private property to harass and expel minorities and opponents. The war’s
territorial changes and enormous destruction further complicated matters. Before being
collectivized under Communist rule, an item could easily have been taken from a political
opponent or member of a minority during World War II and later given to a resettled
refugee.  Who,  then,  was its  legitimate owner? Who was entitled to claim redress for
having been wronged?64
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33 The new governments eliminated some of these problems by limiting claims to property
that  was  confiscated during  the  period of  Communist  rule.  Legislation typically  also
restricted eligibility to resident nationals excluding those, like expelled minorities and
dissidents, who had been harmed in the past but had emigrated and lost their citizenship
during the Communist era. In this way, governments used restitution to promote loyalty
and  political  solidarity  among  their  current  citizens.  Evidently,  the  restoration  of
ownership was meant to convey a message about shared suffering under Communism and
to  further  the  construction  of  new cultural  identities.  The  following  examples  from
Czechoslovakia and Hungary illustrate the implications of such laws. In Czechoslovakia,
the new authorities adopted an extensive restitution program in 1990/91 despite the risk
that  it  would  decelerate  privatization.  At  the  same  time,  legislation  restricted
entitlements to the period of Communist rule beginning in 1948 and imposed citizenship
and  residence  requirements.65 Hungary  introduced  similar  cut‑off  dates,  but  its
legislation was less strict about citizenship and residency. In both countries, the intention
was to exclude ethnic Germans and other minorities who had been expelled at the end of
World War II  from the right to claim redress.  But,  these laws also closed the door to
victims of anti‑Semitic expropriation. In Hungary, this was a particularly sensitive issue.
Long before the Nazi occupation in the spring of 1944, Hungarian Jews had suffered legal
and  economic  discrimination  under  Admiral Miklós Horthy’s  authoritarian  regime.
Moreover, Hungary was bound by the 1947 peace treaty to comply with international
obligations to return Jewish property including communal and heirless assets. Previous
regimes had largely ignored those obligations.66
34 As  they  affected  claimants  abroad,  national  restitution  practices  attracted  external
attention  and  international  criticism  including  protests  from  international  Jewish
organizations  and complaints  from German diplomats  over  the  exclusion  of  German
expellees.  The  ensuing  controversy  over  conflicting  entitlements  was  a  minefield  of
antagonistic  claims  and  associated  memories.  In  the  eyes  of  foreign  observers,
re‑privatization  emerged  as  the  yardstick  for  gauging  post‑Communist  governments’
success at grappling with their history, for restitution arrangements seemed to indicate
whether the new elites were at all  sincere in their desire to acknowledge unpleasant
aspects of national history and, beyond that, whether they would respect the values of
equality, diversity, and tolerance in their dealing with past abuse. Not only because of the
claims’  connection to  the  Holocaust  but  also  because  of  the  region’s  long history  of
domestic anti‑Semitism, observers came to see Jewish claims as the test case. For all these
reasons, ownership increasingly connoted memory, recognition, and the transnational
validity of rights give the large numbers of Jewish absentee claimants.
35 Parallel  events  reinforced  those  connotations  and,  in  setting  new  parameters  for
addressing  the  unresolved  legacy  of  the  past,  forged  closer  links  between
post‑Communist re‑privatization and restitution demands stemming from the Nazi era.
The end of the Cold War paved the way for the formal ending of World War II that had
been prevented in the 1940s by the intensifying conflict between the superpowers. In lieu
of a peace treaty, the two Germanys and the former occupation powers—Great Britain,
France, the United States, and the Soviet Union—concluded the Two Plus Four Agreement
in 1990. This treaty prepared the ground for German unification and provided the legal
foundation for addressing Nazi‑era claims, which West Germany had refused to settle
during the Cold War, on the basis of the division of Europe and international agreements
of the early 1950s.67 In the 1990s,  however, that position was no longer tenable,  and,
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consequently, the Federal Republic had to offer global compensation payments to Eastern
European states plus Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Though designed as reparations for
victims  of  the  Nazis,  the  German government  also  utilized  the  transferred  funds  to
encourage  reconciliation  and  as  incentives  for  market  liberalization  in  the  region.68
German  reparations  reinforced  the  connection  between  righting  past  wrongs  and
creating favorable conditions for capitalist economies.
36 Finally, the fall of the Berlin Wall created fresh opportunities for Jewish organizations to
reassert  unsuccessful  claims  against  the  GDR.  After  abandoning  plans  for  special
restitution legislation in the late 1940s,  East Germany in subsequent  years  persistently
refused to return Jewish assets. The restoration of private property contradicted party
doctrine, and official propaganda, with an unmistakably anti‑Semitic edge, reviled former
property owners as capitalist exploiters. Until 1990, the GDR denied any responsibility for
the crimes of the Third Reich, and it did not consider Jewish victims of the Nazis as
deserving special attention. Inevitably, with the collapse of Communism East Germany
faced an avalanche of claims whose settlement would strain its already tense financial
situation. Moreover, spontaneous privatizations in the early transition period frequently
bypassed Jewish claims, outcomes that alarmed Jewish organizations and seemed to bode
ill for the future of Holocaust survivors in unified Germany. Repeatedly reminding the
German  and  American  governments  of  outstanding  restitution  claims,  the  Claims
Conference and the World Jewish Congress hoped to secure a binding statement from
top‑level  authorities  in either  country.  During preparatory talks  on monetary union,
however, East and West German negotiators did not come to a conclusive agreement: the
East Germans favored global compensation payments for settling Jewish claims while the
Kohl administration insisted on giving restitution precedence over compensation. The
West German position eventually prevailed, and restitution guarantees were included in
an appendix to the 1990 Unification Treaty. Ensuing legislation gave priority to Nazi‑era
confiscations, and subsequent practice in hearing Jewish claims followed the principle
that “restitution of looted property appeared to be the best guarantee for the damage to
be repaired.”69 In prioritizing restitution in kind, the Kohl administration both satisfied
Jewish demands and exhibited its commitment to private ownership and the sanctity of
property rights. Unified Germany, swayed by the “belief in the central role that private
property should play in the fabric of society,” thus set an example for the region.70
37 Different  developments  reinforcing  each  other—heightened  concerns  about  how
post‑Communist  countries  were  implementing  re‑privatization  and  treating  Jewish
claims  and  a  new  awareness  of  the  legacy  of  the  Holocaust  attendant  on  German
unification—brought growing international scrutiny to restitution practices in Central
and  Eastern  Europe.  When  gauged  by  the  German  model,  there  were  serious
shortcomings.  In the eyes of foreign observers,  inconsistencies in national restitution
laws raised questions about the new establishments’ commitment to protecting private
ownership.71 Transitional governments were not entirely insensitive to such concerns.
Restoration of ownership, after all, signified progress in becoming a “normal society,”
and popular opinion in many transitional countries equated such “normality” with the
West’s  way  of  organizing  legal  institutions  and  society  in  general.72 Similarly,
post‑Communist  governments  were  sensitive  to  pressure  from  abroad  because  they
depended on foreign loans and investment. The desire to adhere to Western standards for
the rule of law motivated revisions in restitution practice, which were mainly in favor of
Jewish claims. In Hungary, for instance, new provisions in 1991 extended the cut‑off date
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to 1 May 1939 to include anti‑Semitic expropriations under Admiral Horthy’s rule. In the
Czech Republic, for another example, amended legislation in 1994 and 2000 recognized
the claims of Jewish citizens whose goods had been confiscated between 1939 and 1945
and settled the conflict over Jewish community assets, respectively.73
38 To  defend  Jewish  interests  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  advocates  for  Holocaust
survivors  founded  a  new agency,  the  World  Jewish  Restitution  Organization  (WJRO),
which became an international player in the “new world order” of the 1990s and could
increasingly  count  on  American  support.  Its  interventions  with  post‑Communist
authorities were instrumental in raising Holocaust awareness in the region. It also drew
on the pattern of cooperation with U.S. government agencies that advocates for Jewish
rights had established in previous years.  In the 1980s,  American diplomats tended to
make  commercial  negotiations  with  countries  of  the  Eastern  Bloc  dependent  on
compliance  with  the  human‑rights  principles  of  the  Helsinki  Accords,  such  as  the
protection of minorities and facilitating Jewish emigration to Israel. In the 1990s, U.S.
government agencies were even more willing to heed Jewish demands in their relations
with the former Communist countries and support the activity of the WJRO.74 As a result,
the U.S. State Department demonstrated a growing inclination to connect restitution and
human‑rights policy and make Jewish property claims the touchstone of post‑Communist
societies’ commitment to Western legal culture.
39 A key event  in globalizing restitution and connecting it  to  unresolved Holocaust‑era
issues was the meeting in November 1994 between leaders of the World Jewish Congress
and the senior U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke. One of its results was the appointment in
January 1995 of Stuart Eizenstat as the U.S.  Special  Envoy on Property Restitution in
Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  In  May  of  that  year,  Eizenstat  toured  the  region  on  a
fact‑finding mission and communicated his  government’s  strong interest  in property
restitution to leaders of post‑Communist countries—this was shortly before the wave of
Holocaust‑restitution claims in Western Europe and the United States. At about the same
time, a letter from members of Congress, indicating their growing interest in the issue,
requested the Secretary of State to support “appropriate legislation providing for the
prompt restitution and/or compensation of property and assets seized by the former Nazi
and/or Communist regimes” in that region and framed the problem of restitution as an
American concern.75
40 U.S. authorities, of course, had no legal competence to intervene in sovereign countries’
domestic  matters,  but  they  had  the  means,  as  the  only  remaining  superpower,  to
persuade post‑Communist governments to comply with their wishes. Mounting American
interest in the issue and the U.S. government’s readiness to consider the treatment of
Jewish  property  as  a  touchstone  of  new  democracies’  progress  on  the  road  to
normalization prepared the ground for the massive resurgence of claims and survivors’
class‑action litigation in the second half of the 1990s. Moreover, the American approach
was informed by a new theory of restitution that emphasized symbolic aspects and, in
particular,  the relationship between private property and memory and the idea that
restitution practices expressed a society’s  general  attitudes vis‑à‑vis the institution of
private  ownership.  “Property  restitution,”  Stuart  Eizenstat  explained  in  a  1999
congressional  hearing,  “is  an integral  part of  the economic and political  reform now
underway in central and eastern Europe. It reflects, and contributes to, the development
of  democratic  and  pluralistic  institutions.  By  establishing  new  legal  protections  for
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private and other non‑state ownership, property restitution helps establish a sound basis
for a market economy.”76
41 Eizenstat’s remark, which wedded capitalism and human rights into a seemingly natural
union,  became  the  guiding  principle  of  Western  restitution  diplomacy.  By  restoring
property rights without any kind of discrimination, post‑Communist states could exhibit
their readiness “to act in their political and economic interests.” There were EU and
NATO memberships as rewards for good performance. “At this exciting time in history, a
time when former communist nations are yearning to belong more fully to the West, …we
have an opportunity to help these countries achieve their full  potential.  As states in
Central and Eastern Europe undertake the reforms they must complete in order to qualify
for NATO and EU membership, they are examining the issue of property restitution and
are  looking  to  the  United  States  for  guidance.  The  United  States  Government  has
continually and specifically stressed to them that uniform, fair and complete restitution
is  a  prerequisite  both  to  adequate  establishment  of  the  rule  of  law  and  to  the
safeguarding of religious and minority rights and freedoms. We have stressed that, in
joining  the  Euro‑Atlantic  mainstream  and  applying  for  membership  in  multilateral
organizations, these countries are seeking to join a community of values,” Randolph Bell,
the State Department’s Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, outlined in a 2002 hearing
before the U.S. Helsinki Commission.77
42 In sum, restitution metamorphosed, within a decade, from an instrument for facilitating
privatization after the fall of Communism and promoting feelings of national solidarity in
post‑Communist  societies  into  the  touchstone  of  political  decency,  the  international
benchmark of a society’s respect for human rights and freedom as exemplified by their
willingness to protect private property. Given this new meaning, restitution testified to
changing ownership practices  and,  at  the  same time,  reinforced a  trend that  recent
scholarship has described as “propertization.”78
 
Paradoxes of Ownership Practices under Neoliberal
Hegemony
43 “A successful property restitution program is an indicator of the effectiveness of the rule
of law in a democratic country. Non‑discriminatory, effective property laws are also of
crucial  importance  to  a  healthy  market  economy,”  proclaimed  the  U.S.  State
Department’s  website  on  Holocaust  issues  2013.79 Informed  by  the  post‑Communist
transition and the Holocaust‑era restitution campaign of the 1990s, ownership protection
has crystallized into the epitome of human rights and the chief indicator of the stability
of an economy’s institutional organization. This is a message that can be found, with little
variation  since  the  late  1990s,  in  countless  declarations  issued  by  multinational
organizations and Western governments. Restitution is the practice for which ownership
provides the theory. And yet, the tendency to associate, even identify, human rights with
ownership is neither revolutionary nor particularly new but the legacy of more than
three centuries of Western theorizing. As the supposed essence of individual agency and
most  fundamental  precondition of  liberty,  it  has  echoed the  tradition of  “possessive
individualism” since the days of John Locke and his assumption about the foundation of
private property in the pre‑contractual, natural state of human existence.80 So, where is
the novelty in the late‑twentieth century’s preoccupation with private property? And,
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what explains the growing practical and symbolic significance of ownership, which recent
restitution campaigns have drawn on and fueled at the same time?
44 In  the  past  three  decades,  possessive  individualism  has  undergone  substantial
transformation under the impact of neoliberal regulation. The institution, and the legal
protection,  of  private  property,  including the  unrestricted employment,  control,  and
ability to dispose of one’s assets, has gained unprecedented importance. Since the 1980s,
growing global recognition of private ownership, and the social relations it encapsulates,
has galvanized the institution and increasingly vested it with self‑evidence—sanctified by
countless declarations of international organizations and reified by privatization efforts
that created new social facts.81 The international confirmation of private property as a
universal institution was concurrent with its geographical spread and its expansion to
encompass  a  growing  number  of  collective  goods  such  as  cultural  knowledge  and
intellectual production; genetic material and parts of the human body; and water, air, and
other natural resources. Bolstered by trade agreements, a new institutional framework,
and general trends in economic globalization, new international practices have turned
goods  previously  inaccessible  to  private  ownership  into  commodities.  As  a  result,
propertization has transformed virtually every social relation into a form of ownership
and, concomitantly, exposed it to competitive market forces. The restitution campaigns
of the 1990s, in other words, “took place within the framework of an affirmative and
universalistic discourse on ownership,” which, according to the historian Hannes Siegrist,
has invigorated, systematized, and politically entrenched the notion of private property.82
45 While post‑Communist  privatization has contributed to establishing private property,
restitution, in associating property rights with justice and healing, has given the practice
of ownership moral justification. It has provided a specific, moral vocabulary of justice,
personhood, and freedom and informed a discourse that has raised the symbolic and
cultural significance of private ownership by linking its denial to the memory of state
crimes  aimed  at  the  destruction  of  the  person  and  her  identity.  This  discourse  has
boosted the emotional investment in the return of confiscated property and the (partial)
restoration of the social relations believed to have been embodied in previous ownership
structures.  In  Poland,  for  instance,  a  recent  study  shows  how  restitution  claims
emphasizing  the  connection  between  private  property,  especially  real  estate,  and
tradition have turned the institution into “a stronghold of the culturally defined nation.”
This  was exemplified by the fact  that  the Catholic  Church,  which embodied national
survival during periods in which the Polish nation had ceased to existas a sovereign state,
was one of the main beneficiaries of re‑privatization. Similarly, in the past two decades,
the language of dispossession and ownership has become central to the configuration of
destruction, loss, and mourning in cultural representations of the Holocaust.83
46 Yet,  those  developments,  though  invigorating  the  institution  of  private  property  by
giving it  new cultural  meaning,  do not  necessarily  harmonize with the principles  of
market fundamentalism intrinsic to neoliberal ownership practices. Rather, deregulation
and the dismantling of controls on capital since the 1980s have enormously accelerated
capital flows. With the support of Western governments, the Bretton Woods institutions
have urged debtor nations all over the globe to liberalize financial markets, open their
economies to foreign investment, and, thereby, provide incentives for mobilizing capital
including  land  ownership.84 In  the  service  of  profit  maximization,  property  is
commoditized while capital becomes increasingly volatile, moving in and out of countries
with growing speed, and, thus, a factor of destabilization to which financial crises since
Second‑Wave Holocaust Restitution, Post‑Communist Privatization, and the Glob...
Yod, 21 | 2018
17
the 1990s  have  given  impressive  testimony.85 Such  a  functionalist  understanding  of
property and its uprooting impact on societies, however, undermines the significance of
ownership for social belonging and individual identity.
47 Second‑wave Holocaust  restitution cannot be isolated from those broader trends and
their paradoxical impact. The resurgence of claims and their successful resolutions, while
strengthened  by  the  growing  importance  of  private  property,  also  testify  to  the
above‑mentioned  ambiguities.  On  the  one  hand, the  insistence  on  the  return  of
communal property in Central and Eastern Europe was a precondition for Jewish revival
in  the  regions  and,  as  such,  emphasized  the  links  among  ownership,  identity,  and
belonging. The individual claims pressed by Holocaust survivors and their descendants,
on the other hand, contributed to the mobilizing of property. Opposition to eligibility
restrictions,  such as  citizenship and residence requirements,  was  meant  to  eliminate
discrimination  against  Jewish  claimants  most  of  whom  had  emigrated  in  previous
decades. Criticism of restrictions imposed on absentee claimants also targeted provisions
which impeded the transnational exercise of property rights and proved to be an obstacle
to the mobility of capital. This latter implication was crucial for the region’s integration
into global markets and facilitated foreign investment in Central and Eastern European
countries. And in associating Jewish property with remembrance and the new cultural
meaning of the Holocaust, restitution eventually proved instrumental in transforming
ownership into what is considered to be the very essence of universal human rights. In so
doing, it contributed to the conflation of capitalism and human rights—“free market and
democracy”—in the concept of ownership. Given this conflated meaning, the Holocaust
restitution campaign can be understood as part of the project “to reframe the expansion
of capitalist social relations as a force of emancipation and empowerment,” a process
whose outcome is unpredictable and obviously difficult to equate with the triumph of
even imperfect justice.86
 
Concluding remarks
48 It has been my aim in this article to show that Holocaust‑era restitution did not originate
in the sudden changes in mentalities or sentiment that promoted the recognition of past
wrongs of states and private agents but was part of a larger process involving major
transformations  in  global  capitalism and  property  regimes.  Restitution,  fashioned  as
re‑privatization,  surfaced in  the  early  1990s  in  connection with  the  post‑Communist
de‑collectivization  that  was  included  in  the  neoliberal  reform  package  adopted  by
transitional societies in Central and Eastern Europe. By the end of that decade, however,
it had attained a much wider significance as a token of justice, memory, and identity
because  international  scrutiny  of  national  restitution  practices  had  turned  the
restoration of property rights into an indicator of post‑Communist societies’ willingness
to deal with their past and their commitment to human rights. As a “travelling concept”
that coupled private property with novel ideas of historical justice on its road from east
to west  and west  to east,  restitution gradually changed from a method of  advancing
privatization and creating new polities to a carrier of the memory of past wrongs.87 By
virtue  of  its  association  with  remembrance  and  historical  justice,  private  property
correspondingly  metamorphosed  from  a  device  for  expediting  the  transition  to
capitalism to the core principle of  the global  value system.  This  was a  seminal  shift
preparing the ground for the resurgence of Holocaust‑era restitution in Western Europe
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and the United States and the new sympathy survivors’ claims found with the political
establishment and a portion of the public. By endorsing restitution while pushing for
deregulation and privatization domestically and abroad, political leaders could pose as
champions  of  justice  without  contradicting  their  neoliberal  commitments.  On  the
contrary, in the political climate of the 1990s, their support for the Holocaust survivors’
cause  ennobled  the  crusade  for  the  expansion  of  private  ownership.  As  the  main
beneficiaries of changes in global capitalism—privatization, new international investment
opportunities,  deregulation  of  financial  markets,  and  the  increasing  transnational
mobility  of  capital—multinational  corporations,  the  primary  targets  of  Holocaust
restitution claims in the 1990s,  had a  genuine interest  in  supporting those  trends  by
accepting  novel  concepts  of  accountability  and  participating  in  the  period’s
propertization frenzy by paying their entry into globalizing markets.
49 This is the broader context that has to be considered if one is to understand the wider
implications of second‑wave Holocaust restitution beyond its moral significance for the
victims and the achievement of belated justice. It is a context in which property claims
were the most  promising way to insert  a  call  for  justice into a hegemonic discourse
organized around neoliberal assumptions about ownership as the foundation of human
agency. The resurgence of Holocaust‑era restitution claims in the 1990s partly relied on
this new notion of ownership; partly it propelled the identification of ownership with
human rights in general and of expropriation, in turn, with the negation and destruction
of the person. Second‑wave Holocaust restitution,  therefore,  was a paradigm for how
justice  claims  could  be  articulated  under  the  condition  of  neoliberal  hegemony.
Ownership  provided  a  moral  language  that  enabled  survivors  to  express  feelings  of
injustice,  loss,  and  suffering  in  a  new  way  that  resonated  with  global  leaders  and
economic players. This new situation allowed the project of righting past wrong to spread
widely. Yet, it also included the travesty of reducing the responsibility for genocide to the
settlement  of  property  claims.  And,  all  of  this  occurred against  the backdrop of  the
obvious dilemma afflicting current ownership practice, viz., the tension between its being
constitutive of personhood while serving as a highly depersonalized vehicle of capital
mobility.
50 I  am indebted to  Frank Haldemann and Greg Sax  for  their  invaluable  comments  and
suggestions on earlier versions of this essay. My gratitude also goes to the organizers of
the Conference “Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations” at Tel Aviv University,
December 2012,  and  the 2013  Summer  Research  Workshop  “The  Politics  of  Repair:
Restitution and Reparations in the Wake of the Holocaust” at the United States Holocaust
Memorial  Museum’s Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies for providing a forum to
discuss the ideas expressed in this article with colleagues and specialists of restitution
history.
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  argues  show that  the emergence in  the 1990s  of  a  second wave of  Holocaust‑era
restitution claims was not the result of a shift in mentalities leading to the sudden recognition of
past wrongs or the surge of repressed memories but rather part of a larger process involving
major  transformations  in  global  capitalism  and  property  regimes.  Restitution,  fashioned  as
re‑privatization,  surfaced  in  the  early 1990s  in  connection  with  post‑Communist
de‑collectivization  and  was  included  in  neoliberal  reform  packages  adopted  by  transitional
societies in Central and Eastern Europe. By the end of that decade, restitution attained a much
wider  significance  as  a  token  of  justice,  memory,  and  identity.  International  scrutiny  of
restitution  mechanisms  implemented  by  post‑Communist  states  turned  the  restoration  of
property  rights  into  an  indicator  of  these  societies’  commitment  to  human rights  and their
willingness to address the legacies of their totalitarian past. As a “travelling concept” linking
private property with novel ideas of historical justice on its road from east to west and west to
east, restitution gradually changed from a method of advancing privatization and creating new
polities to a carrier of the memory of past wrongs. In this entirely new meaning, restitution
became the heart of Holocaust survivors’ fin‑de‑siècle call for justice and recognition.
Cet  article  tend à  montrer  que l’émergence,  dans  les  années 1990,  d’une deuxième vague de
demandes  de  restitutions  de  la  part  de  victimes  de  la  Shoah  n’était  pas  le  résultat  d’un
changement de mentalités qui aurait conduit à la reconnaissance soudaine des fautes du passé ou
au  retour  de  souvenirs  refoulés,  mais  qu’elle  s’est  inscrite  dans  un  processus  plus  vaste
impliquant des transformations majeures dans le capitalisme mondial et le statut de la propriété
privée. Cette politique de restitution, conçue comme une nouvelle privatisation, a vu le jour au
cours  de cette  période dans le  cadre de la  décollectivisation postcommuniste  et  a  été  partie
intégrante  des  programmes  de  réforme  néolibérale  adoptés  par  les  sociétés  en  transition
d’Europe centrale et orientale. À la fin de cette décennie, elle a revêtu une signification beaucoup
plus large en tant que geste symbolique de justice,  de mémoire et  d’identité.  Sous le  regard
attentif porté au plan international sur les mécanismes de restitution mis en œuvre par les États
postcommunistes,  la  restauration  des  droits  de  propriété  est  devenue  un  indicateur  de
l’engagement de ces sociétés dans le domaine des droits de l’homme et de leur volonté d’assumer
l’héritage de leur passé totalitaire. En tant que « concept itinérant » liant la propriété privée à
des idées neuves de justice historique sur sa route d’est en ouest et d’ouest en est, la restitution a
évolué progressivement : d’abord moyen de promotion de la privatisation et de la mise en place
de politiques nouvelles, elle est devenue porteuse de la mémoire des fautes du passé. Dans ce
sens, la restitution est en cette fin de siècle au cœur de la demande des survivants de la Shoah
pour la justice et la reconnaissance.
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תקציר: המאמר מנסה להוכיח כי הגל החדש של תביעות הפיצויים מצד קורבנות השואה בשנות
ה-09 של המאה הקודמת אינו פועל יוצא של מנטאליות חדשה כתוצאה מהתעוררותם של זיכרונות
מודחקים או מהכרה בשגיאות העבר. הוא מהווה חלק מתהליך רחב יותר של שינויים בתפישת
הקפיטליזם העולמי והרכוש הפרטי. מדיניות הפיצויים בתקופה זו היא תוצאה של הפרטה חדשה
במסגרת הדה-קולקטיביזם בתקופה הפוסט-קומוניסטית וחלק מרפורמה נאו-ליברלית בחברות
המשתנות במזרח אירופה ובמרכזה. בסיומו של עשור שנים זה היא קיבלה משמעות רחבה של
מחווה סמלית לצדק, לזיכרון ולזהות. תוך תשומת לב ניכרת לתכנית הפיצויים הבין-לאומית, הפכה
החזרת זכויות הרכוש במדינות הפוסט-קומוניסטיות לציון של מחויבותן של אלו לזכויות האדם
ולרצונן ליישם את שירשו מן העבר הטוטליטארי. מדיניות הפיצויים, כמושג מובילי הקושר את הרכוש
הפרטי לתפישת הצדק ההיסטורי על התוואי שבין מזרח למערב ולהיפך, השתנתה באופן הדרגתי:
מאמצעי לקידום ההפרטה וליישום דרכים חדשות, היא הפכה למגלמת זכרן של שגיאות העבר.
במובן זה תביעות הפיצויים של ניצולי השואה בסוף המאה הקודמת הן בקשה לצדק ולהכרה.
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